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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Kay James Kofoed appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession 
of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Kofoed specifically challenges 
the denial of his motion to suppress. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
While executing a search warrant at Kofoed's residence/workshop in 
Fruitland, police discovered methamphetamine, marijuana, two handguns, and 
various items of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.6-7, 88.) The primary basis for the 
search warrant was reports of a strong chemical smell, consistent with that which 
is present during the manufacture of methamphetamine, originating from 
Kofoed's residence/workshop. (R., p.101) The first report, by a neighbor, was 
made nine days before the execution of the warrant. (R., p.40.) The second 
report, made by the same neighbor and confirmed by police, was made three 
days before the execution of the warrant. (R., p.41.) Because of the timing of 
the warrant, Jaw enforcement was of the opinion that although the "operational 
laboratory w[ould] not be discovered" lab items, precursors to production, 
paraphernalia, and the finished product -- methamphetamine -- would be found. 
(R., p.41.) 
The warrant was executed by the Fruitland Police Department and the 
Payette County Sheriff's Office. (Tr., p.20, L.24 - p.21, L.2.) The lead law 
enforcement officer announced the law enforcement presence and that they 
possessed a warrant. (Tr., p.23, Ls.15-22.) Following that announcement, there 
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was a loud noise, like something metal was dropped or kicked, followed by 
noticeable scuffling going away from the door. (Tr., p.23, L.18 - p.27, L.2.) 
Because of what they heard, the officers immediately entered the premises to 
stop what they believed would be the destruction of evidence. (Tr., p.26, Ls.2-
11.) 
Pursuant to the items discovered in the search and the testimony of 
individuals located inside the residence/workshop, the state charged Kofoed with 
one count of possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.6-7.) Following a 
preliminary hearing, the court ordered Kofoed bound over to the district court. 
(R., p.55.) Kofoed moved to suppress, challenging the validity and terms of the 
search warrant and asserting that police did not comply with the knock-and-
announce requirement. (R., pp. 60-81.) After taking evidence at a hearing, the 
court rejected Kofoed's claims. (R., pp. 100-08.) In a written opinion, the district 
court concluded that the warrant was valid and, under the facts of the case, there 
were exigent circumstances that justified the officers' hurried entry into Kofoed's 
residence. (R., pp. 100-08.) 
Subsequent to the court's ruling, Kofoed entered into a plea agreement. 
(R., p.114-18.) Kofoed reserved, however, his right to appeal the district court's 
denial of his motion to suppress. (R., p.114-18.) Consistent with that 
reservation, Kofoed filed a timely appeal. (R., pp. 141-43.) 
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ISSUES 
Kofoed states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Kofoed's motion to 
suppress? 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Kofoed failed to show error in the district court's conclusion 
that the police acted reasonably in entering Kofoed's residence after they 
knocked and announced and subsequently heard indications of noncompliance 
suggesting destruction of evidence? 
2. Does Hudson v. Michigan require this Court to readdress the 
application of the exclusionary rule to violations of the knock-and-announce rule? 
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ARGUMENT 
Kofoed Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Conclusion That Law 
Enforcement's Hurried Entry Was Constitutionally Justified 
A. Introduction 
While executing a search warrant on a building in which the police had 
probable cause to believe methamphetamine was present, police knocked and 
announced their presence. After hearing a load noise, "like something either 
being kicked or dropped" followed by footsteps and scuffling going away from the 
door, police entered the residence. (Tr., p. 24, L.13 - p.26, L.15.) The district 
court determined, in light of these facts, that exigent circumstances excused 
compliance with the constitutional and statutory "knock-and-announce" 
requirements. (R., pp.105-06.) Kofoed claims there was no exigent 
circumstance that justified police entry. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-9.) Specifically, 
he argues that police did not act reasonably because "it is highly unlikely that 
movement away from the door would create the exigency that the evidence 
would be destroyed" because "the officers were unsure of the quantities of drugs 
they might" find in the residence. (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Application of the law 
to the circumstances present here shows that the officers had justification for 
their hurried entry -- the movement going away from the door indicated 
noncompliance with law enforcement's statement of presence and authority and 
provided reasonable suspicion to believe that evidence was being or about to be 
destroyed. Furthermore, even if the hurried entry was unjustified, the proper 
remedy was not suppression because Kofoed cannot show that "but for" the early 
entry, the evidence he sought to suppress would not have been discovered. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
Whether police have complied with "knock-and-announce" requirements is 
a mixed issue of fact and law in which the court defers to the factual findings of 
the trial court, if supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews application 
of the law to the facts found. State v. Sorbel, 124 Idaho 275, 280, 858 P:2d 814, 
819 (Ct. App. 1993) (addressing Idaho's "knock-and-announce" statute). 
C. Police Had Reasonable Suspicion To Believe That Evidence Was Being 
Destroyed And, Therefore, Had Justification For Their Early Entrance 
Kofoed claims there was no exigent circumstance that justified law 
enforcement's hurried entry after they knocked and announced their presence. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-9.) As a result, Kofoed asserts his Fourth Amendment 
rights were violated and that the evidence should have been suppressed 
pursuant to the exclusionary rule. (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) Kofoed's claims 
lack merit. Law enforcement needed no exigent circumstance to justify the 
hurried entry because the movement inside the premises indicated that the 
occupants would not comply with law enforcement's lawful demands. Further, 
law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to believe that evidence would be 
destroyed and, as a result, had a basis for entering the premises without waiting 
for compliance to their knock and announce. Additionally, even if there was a 
violation of the knock-and-announce rule, exclusion of the items found in the 
search is not the proper remedy under either the United States or Idaho 
constitutions. 
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1. The Movement Away From The Door Immediately After Law 
Enforcement Knocked Justified Police Entry 
Kofoed claims the movement away from the door was insufficient to create 
an exigent circumstance that justified the hurried entry. Prior to executing a 
search warrant, law enforcement must knock on the door, announce their identity 
and authority, and wait a reasonable time for the occupants to respond before 
entering forcibly. State v. Ramos, 142 Idaho 628,630, 130 P.3d 1166 (Ct. App. 
2006) (citing United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003); Richards v. 
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 387 (1997); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 
(1995)). The rule is not absolute and courts have recognized, under some 
circumstances, an unannounced entry is permissible. lli Specific exigencies 
include threats to officer safety or a likelihood that evidence might be destroyed. 
lli Even if exigent circumstances are initially absent, reasonable suspicion of an 
exigency may develop when the police arrive to execute a search warrant, and 
the police may then proceed with immediate forced entry. lli (citing Banks, 540 
U.S. at 37). "The police may also conduct a forced entry after knocking and 
announcing if exigent circumstances arise prior to an occupant answering the 
door." lli (citing Banks, 540 U.S. at 38). 
As a threshold matter, the police complied by the knock-and-announce 
rule by entering the premises only after they heard noises indicating 
noncompliance. A primary purpose of the knock-and-announce rule is to give the 
occupants of a residence, subject to the execution of a warrant, the opportunity 
to peaceably comply. Jones v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d 455, 467 (7th Cir. 2005) ("This 
knock-and-announce requirement serves to protect residents' ability to comply 
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with the law by peaceably permitting officers to enter their dwelling .... "). Here, 
the police officer articulated facts and rational inferences that justified entry a 
short moment after the officers knocked and announced their presence. Under 
the circumstances, their wait, although short, was reasonable because it was 
long enough for the police to determine the occupant's response --
noncompliance. The officer stated that they knocked on the door to the 
premises, announced that they were with the sheriff's office, and that they had a 
search warrant. (Tr., p.23, Ls.15-22.) Only then, after the occupants knew of the 
police presence and the inevitability of the premise being searched, did they 
respond by moving away from the door. (Tr., p.23, L.18 - p.27, L.2.) This shows 
that the police not only complied with the knock-and-announce requirements but 
also waited a reasonable amount of time. Thus, regardless of any applicable 
exigency, the officers' hurried entry complied with the mandates of the rule. 
The indication of non-compliance, coupled with the probable cause that 
there was contraband present, created reasonable articulable suspicion that 
evidence was being destroyed or about to be destroyed. Accordingly, early entry 
was justified as an exigent circumstance. See, !Lll,_, United States v. Mitchell, 
783 F.2d 971, 973 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 860 (1986) (finding exigent 
circumstance where police waited only three to five seconds after they knocked 
and announced, and "heard sounds of people moving inside the house [that] 
suggested the occupants were not moving towards the door"); McClure v. United 
States, 332 F.2d 19, 21-22 (9th Cir. 1964) (early entry justified as exigent 
circumstance after police heard footsteps going away from the door); United 
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States v. Barrett, 725 F.Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1989) (early entry of police justified as 
exigent circumstance after law enforcement knocked and announced and heard 
footsteps moving away from the door). 
Kofoed argues, however, that because "the officers possessed information 
that manufacturing was occurring in the residence, it is highly unlikely that 
movement away from the door would create the exigency that the evidence 
would be destroyed" and, therefore, that the officers were not excused from 
"complying with the knock-and-announce rule." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) 
Kofoed's claim is misplaced. The search warrant made clear that the 
officers did not believe they would find "an operational laboratory" at the time 
they executed the search warrant -- but rather, items like beakers, paraphernalia, 
and methamphetamine. (R., p.41.) This was based on the fact that the cooking 
odor had been detected three days earlier. (R., pp.39-40.) Indeed, the search 
warrant itself specified that police were looking for "various quantities" of 
methamphetamine as opposed to a laboratory. (R., p.35.) Further, 
paraphernalia and the final product itself, methamphetamine, is evidence of 
criminal activity that can potentially be destroyed or altered in a short period of 
time. Consequently, Kofoed's claim that police knowledge of prior manufacturing 
negates the reasonable suspicion that evidence was being destroyed is without 
merit. 
Additionally, Kofoed's argument implies that the exigency is not applicable 
where some but not all of the evidence can be destroyed. This argument is 
logically flawed and ignores a foundational principle of the exigency rule -- that 
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"[s]uspects have no constitutional right to destroy or dispose of evidence." Ker v. 
California, 374 U.S. 23, 39 (1963). There is no indication that this statement is 
qualified -- that suspects are entitled to destroy evidence up to a certain point or 
to the point of being prosecuted for the most serious crime that law enforcement 
might be investigating. Indeed, following Kofoed's reasoning, the potential for 
being prosecuted for manufacturing or distributing a controlled substances 
precludes any exigency that relates to evidence that would lead to a crime like 
possession. This is not the test. See Ramos, 142 Idaho at 632, 130 P.3d at 
1170 ("The type of evidence that provides reasonable suspicion of exigent 
circumstances, allowing forced entry after the police arrive or after they knock 
and announce, is to be determined on a case-by-case basis by considering the 
totality of the circumstances.") 
Accordingly, the movement away from the door, coupled with the totality of 
circumstances, including the probable cause that there was methamphetamine 
and paraphernalia present that could be destroyed, created an exigent 
circumstances that justified entry. 
2. Suppression Is Not The Proper Remedy Under The Idaho Or 
United States Constitution 
Kofoed moved the district court to suppress based on his claim of "Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his 
rights under the Idaho Constitution Article I, Section 17." (R., p.61.) On appeal, 
Kofoed maintains that suppression is the proper remedy in this case. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) 
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It is well established that in order for the exclusionary rule to apply there 
must be a causal connection between the police misconduct and the evidence 
sought to be suppressed. In State v. Lusby, --- P.3d ---, ---- 2008 WL 2278074 
(Idaho App., June 5, 2008), the court affirmed the district court's order 
suppressing evidence found pursuant to a search incident to arrest because it 
was not sufficiently connected to the illegal entry. The Court reasoned: 
Because the exclusionary rule imposes a price upon society that 
can enable the guilty to escape prosecution, the exclusionary rule is 
only applicable if there is a causal connection between the police 
misconduct and the acquisition of the challenged evidence 
).9.,. at *1. See also, State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184, 125 P.3d 536,540 
(Ct. App. 2005) ("Suppression is required only if the evidence sought to be 
suppressed would not have come to light but for the government's 
unconstitutional conduct.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Nowhere have Idaho courts identified an exception to this general rule. 
Consistent with this standard articulated by Idaho Courts, the United 
States Supreme Court has recently provided guidance on the requirement of a 
direct causal connection between the police misconduct and the item sought to 
be suppressed. In Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), a case that 
involved a knock-and-announce violation, the Court held that the exclusionary 
rule was dependent on both "but for" causation and attenuation of that causation. 
).9.,. at 592. On the first requisite -- "but for" causation, the court made clear that 
"but-for causality is ... a necessary ... condition for suppression." ).9.,. The court 
reasoned that a violation of the knock-and-announce rule did not meet this "but 
for" standard: "In this case of course, the constitutional violation of an illegal 
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manner of entry was not a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence. Whether that 
preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the police would have executed the 
warrant they had obtained, and would have discovered the gun and drugs inside 
the house." kl at 592 (emphasis in the original). The Supreme Court also 
clarified prior precedent that may have indicated a wider application of the 
exclusionary rule, including Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and Whitely v. 
Warden. Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 568-69 (1971 ). Hudson, 547 
U.S. at 591. 
The Supreme Court also recognized that "cases excluding the fruits of 
unlawful warrrantless searches. say nothing about the appropriateness of 
exclusion to vindicate the interests protected by the knock-and-announce 
requirement" and, consequently, that the causal connection is different. See 
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592. The court reasoned: 
Until a valid warrant has issued, citizens are entitled to shield "their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects," from government scrutiny. 
Exclusion of the evidence obtained by a warrantless search 
vindicates that entitlement. The interests protected by the knock-
and-announce requirement are quire different -- and do not include 
the shielding of potential evidence from the government's eyes. 
kl Thus, the Court not only recognized a difference between the manner of 
entry and entitlement of entry but the court has also recognized the fact that 
those differences protect different interests. Consequently, where a valid warrant 
exists and permits entry there is no "but for" connection between the manner of 
entry and the evidence ultimately located in the place the warrant permits to be 
searched. 
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No Idaho court since Hudson has directly discussed this "but for" 
causation requirement -- particularly as it relates to violations of the knock-and-
announce rule. Kofoed asserts, nevertheless, that Idaho's exclusionary rule has 
been interpreted differently and that no "but for" causation need exist in the 
knock-and-announce context. Kofoed acknowledges Hudson, but claims that 
Hudson is inconsequential and irrelevant to any state constitutional analysis 
regarding the application of the exclusionary rule. (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) 
Kofoed makes this claim even though the language of Article 17 of the Idaho 
constitution and the Fourth Amendment are virtually the same and where he has 
provided no justification for interpreting Article 17 differently. As recognized by 
this Court: 
We are not required to follow United States Supreme Court 
precedent in interpreting United States Supreme Court precedent in 
interpreting Article I, § 17. However, our Supreme Court has 
recently observed that: "There is merit in having the same rule of 
law applicable within the borders of our state, whether an 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment or its counterpart -- Article 
I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution -- is involved. Such consistency 
makes sense to the police and the public." 
State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126,130,982 P.2d 961,965 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing 
and quoting State v. Charpentier, 131 Idaho 649, 653, 962 P.2d 1033, 1037 
(1998)). 
Several neutral, nonexclusive criteria must be examined when an 
argument is made for a divergence between federal and state constitutional law. 
These criteria include: 1) the textual language of the state constitution; 2) 
significant differences in the text of parallel provisions of the federal and state 
constitutions; 3) state constitutional and common law history; 4) preexisting state 
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law; 5) differences in structure between the federal and state constitutions; 6) 
matters of particular state interest or local concern; 7) public attitudes; and 8) 
state traditions. See, ~. State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 825 P.2d 501 
(1992) (Bistline, J., concurring); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 812-813 (Wash. 
1986). Even assuming the court were to consider whether to differentiate 
between the two constitutions, Kofoed has failed to demonstrate that the 
application of any these criteria provides a valid basis for interpreting Article I, § 
17 of the Idaho Constitution any differently than its federal counterpart, the 
Fourth Amendment. Therefore, Kofoed's argument must fail. 
Kofoed's sole reason for creating an exception are two cases decided 
prior to Hudson -- State v. Ramos, and State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586, 586 P.2d 
671 (1978). Although Rauch and Ramos mention state constitutional grounds, 
they are not premised on those grounds. Notably present in those opinions is the 
heavy reliance on United State's Supreme Court precedent. Indeed, in Ramos, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals acknowledged the issue had not been addressed by 
the Supreme Court but predicted, incorrectly, what the Court would do in the 
future. 142 Idaho at 634; 130 P.3d at 1172. Pursuant to this prediction, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals interpreted the Idaho constitution the same way. kl,_ 
Hudson rendered that prediction incorrect and, by so doing, undermined the very 
basis of Kofoed's authority. Notably absent from either opinion is any discussion 
of the factors Idaho courts must be examined when distinguishing between 
federal and state constitutional law. 
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In sum, regardless of the language found in Rauch or Ramos, this Court 
should apply a standard consistent with the federal standard and the other Idaho 
exclusionary rule cases. That standard would mandate suppression when the 
evidence sought to be suppressed would not have come to light "but for" law 
enforcement's illegal conduct. Thus, here, where the evidence would have been 
searched regardless of the claimed illegal entry, there is "no but" for causation 
and, therefore, no basis for suppression. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Kofoed's conviction. 
DATED this 12th day of August 2008. 
~.BO,r ~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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